While it is usually known that the mean value of a single observable is enough to detect entanglement or its distillability, the counterpart of such an approach in the case of quatum privacy has been missing. Here we develop the concept of a privacy witness, i.e. a single observable that may detect presence of the secure key even in the case of bound entanglement. Then we develop the notion of secret key estimation based on few observables and discuss the witness decomposition into local measurements. The surprising property of the witness is that with the help of a low number of product mesurements involved it may still report the key values that are strictly above distillable entanglement of the state. For an exemplary four-qubit state studied in a recent experiment [K. Dobek et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 106, 030501 (2011)] this means 6 Pauli operator product measurements versus 81 needed to carry out the complete quantum state tomography. The present approach may be viewed as a paradigm for the general program of experimentally friendly detection and estimation of task-dedicated quantum entanglement.
I. INTRODUCTION
Entanglement based cryptography [1] , equivalent formally to the BB84 scheme [2] , is the one that uses the power of quantum entanglement monogamy obeyed by a maximally entangled pure quantum state. If the state is noisy then in some cases it is possible to run an entanglement distillation process [3] which may be interpreted as quantum privacy amplification [4] . Since the final output is maximally entangled, it may be used directly for secret key generation. The efficiency of this procedure is quantified with distillable entanglement E D , which defines how many singlet states can be obtained in the asymptotic regime per one input.
Still it was known that certain states which cannot be prepared by local operations and classical communication (LOCC) are not distillable, exhibiting the phenomenon of bound entanglement [5] . For a long time bound entanglement was believed to be useless for cryptography, but several years ago it was shown [6, 7] , that at least some bound entangled states may be useful in quantum cryptography. This is one extreme instance of the general fact that the amount of distillable secure key K D may exceed the amount of distillable singlets E D . The latter effect has been verified in a recent experiment [8] .
The key ingredient in the complete theory of distilling a secret key from quantum states [6, 7] is the notion of a private bit, p-bit -or more generally a private dit, pdit -which is a delocalized maximally entangled state that still retains some entanglement monogamy result. A quantum p-dit is composed from a d⊗d key part AB, and the shield part A ′ B ′ , shared between Alice (subsystems AA ′ ) and Bob (subsystems BB ′ ) in such a way that the local von Neumann measurements on the key part in a particular basis will make its results completely statistically uncorrelated from the results of any measurement of an eavesdropper Eve on her subsystem E, which is a part of the purification |Ψ ABA ′ B ′ E of the p-dit state ̺ ABA ′ B ′ . There is a nice explanation how the shield part protects the statistics of the measurement on A and B to be correlated to Eve: it just makes it impossible to distinguish the results of the measurement by an external observer.
An obvious way to determine privacy properties is to reconstruct tomographically the complete p-dit state ̺ ABA ′ B ′ . This however is a very time consuming process, especially if the system under investigation is highdimensional. The aim of the present paper is to give bounds on the distillable secure key based just on few observables. This advances further the study presented in Ref. [9] , where it was proposed to carry out a tomography of the so-called privacy-squeezed state of the state of merit. We demonstrate that a single observable suffices to provide a nontrivial bound. We also provide more accurate estimates based on two observables. These results provide tools for application-specific detection of entanglement, refining the fundamental concept of the entanglement witness proposed in [10] and [11] that can be also subjected to optimization with respect to local measurements [12, 13] and used to quantify the amount of entanglement [14, 15] .
The present results can be viewed as an outcome of a more general research program: experimentally friendly detection/estimation of task-dedicated quantum entangle-ment and/or correlations. In fact it is quite usual that we are interested in that aspect of entanglement which is useful for specific quantum information task. The quantity characterizing this aspect may be a monotone but we believe that it need not to be in general. For instance it is known that there are cases when specific Bell inequalities which are important for device independent cryptography are better violated by nonmaximally entangled states. In this context we believe that the present paradigm will lead to systematic development of experimentally friendly detection/estimation of resources for quantum information tasks. This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II we elaborate on lower bounds on distillable entanglement and distillable key. In Sec. III we present a lower bound on distillable key in terms of single parameter, i.e. single privacy witness. An approximate version of this bound is presented in Appendix. In Sec. IV we discuss how to infer privacy of a noisy state from the expectation values of two observables. Finally, Sec. V concludes the paper.
II. KEY BOUNDS
Let us start by reviewing how an individual observable can be used to estimate distillable entanglement E D . The most natural observable in this context is a projector
onto a maximally entangled state |Ψ max = [16] . The corresponding rate of the distillation protocol can be easily estimated from below by the hashing protocol [17, 18] which gives an estimate for the distillable entanglement as
where S(·) denotes the von Neumann entropy.
Since an application of the so-called U ⊗ U * twirling [16] can only decrease distillable entanglement E D we may twirl the state̺ AB in order to bring it to a highly symmetric form and then apply the hashing inequality (2) which eventually gives:
where F = F (̺ AB ) and H({p i }) = − i p i log 2 p i is the Shannon entropy. The above formula is valid for any bipartite quantum state̺ AB . There are more sophisticated twirling protocols. For instance for two qubits there is a protocol [19] utilizing selected random Pauli operations that brings the state to a form diagonal in the Bell basis:
where |Ψ i are Bell states. Applying the hashing protocol to̺ Bell AB leads to:
Eqs. (3) and (5) provide bounds on the key rate for̺ AB , as distilled singlet states can be used for the standard Ekert protocol. In general however, this may be not the most efficient way to generate the key. As pointed out in the introduction, a straighforward way to verify that we have a p-bit or a state close to p-dit enough that the secret key may be distilled. It is based on the so-called quantum state tomography which allows to calculate specific entropic functions that can be used to estimate the amount of the secret key from below. A useful quantity is the Devetak-Winter function K → DW which quantifies the secret key distillable through a specific one-way secret key distillation protocol:
The Devetak-Winter function is given explicitly by the difference of two Holevo quantities χ AB and χ AE which characterize the amount of information that can be recovered respectively by Bob and Eve from subsystems B and E after Alice carried out a von Neumann measurement of the subsystem A in the secure basis {|i A }:
The state̺ cqq ABE is given by:
Let us now restrict our attention to a situation when the key part is composed of two qubits A and B. The complete density matrix̺ ABA ′ B ′ can be written as a 4×4 array of blocksÂ ij,kl = AB ij|̺ ABA ′ B ′ |kl AB :
A 01,00Â01,01Â01,10Â01,11 A 10,00Â10,01Â10,10Â10,11
It can be transformed by LOCC (with respect to the partition AA ′ : BB ′ ) to the form: Which can be ,,unwisted" to Bell diagonal matrix which is directly related to privacy squeezed state (see [7, 9] ): 
where the norm || · || stands for the trace norm. It will be convenient to writeσ AB in the form:
It is easy to see thatσ AB is diagonal in the Bell basis and the parameters p i are occupation probabilities of the corresponding Bell states.
There is a useful bound on the secret key which is [9] 
Here I cl (A : B) is the classical mutual information for the outcomes of von Neumann measurements carried out by Alice and Bob in the secure basis |00 AB , |01 AB , |10 AB , |11 AB . As the joint probability distribution for these outcomes is {
denotes the binary entropy.
Note that the bound given in Eq. (13) is weaker than that on distillable entanglement in Eq. (5). This is because the stateσ AB does not actually describe the physical system at any stage of the protocol, but is rather a formal construct characterizing privacy properties of the state̺ ABA ′ B ′ of the complete system ABA ′ B ′ .
III. SINGLE PRIVACY WITNESS
The class of secrecy witnesses we shall consider here is defined formally aŝ
whereÛ A ′ B ′ is any hermitian matrix satisfyingÛ †Û ≤1 1 acting on the shield subsystems A ′ and B ′ .
We will use the expectation value of the secrecy witness Ŵ key to approximate the value of p 1 − p 2 . In fact we have:
since for any matrix satisfyingÛ †Û ≤1 1 one has Tr(ÂÛ ) ≤ ||Â||. Indeed,Û †Û ≤1 1 implies ||Û || ∞ ≤ 1 and consequently TrÂÛ ≤ ||ÂÛ || ≤ ||Â|| · ||Û || ∞ . Sometimes the parameter w may give exactly the value of p 1 − p 2 . We will give an instance of that at the end of this section. Let us also stress that the witness itself (14) is an observable which must be measured on the original state (9) .
Quantitative estimation of the distillable key will be based on the following inequality
applied to Eq. (13), which yields:
As we are interested in the most pessimistic scenario, we need to minimize the right hand side over pairs (p 1 , p 2 ) that satisfy all the constraints. This gives the central formula:
We found numerically the boundary value w * at which the above bound becomes strictly positive, i.e. the witness condition w = | Ŵ key | > w * , to be equal to w * ≈ 0.907. We can simplify the optimization in Eq. (18) by introducing a new pair of variables p + = p 1 + p 2 and
Because the lower limit for ξ + is greater or equal to 1/2, optimization over ξ + for a fixed value of p + yields h(ξ + ) ≤ h (w + p + )/2p + . Consequently, the minimization in Eq. (19) needs to be carried out over a single parameter p + :
The absolute minimum of this expression is analyzed in Appendix. However we can simplify the bound in two ways leading to weaker but more compact formulas:
Weaker bound 1: Suppose that w ≥ (1 − w)/3 which is equivalent to w ≥ 1/4. Then we have the following estimate:
Weaker bound 2: There is a possibility of having another bound with help of subadditivity of the entropy
For a graphic comparison of the derived formulas see Fig. 1 . The above considerations are based on the ccq scenario, when Alice and Bob measure their qubits in the secure key basis |0 , |1 . However if the shield part is not affected by local unitary the optimalÛ remains unchanged. For instance, in the case of the four-qubit state whose approximate version was realized experimentally in Ref. [8] , a two-qubit swap operator V A ′ B ′ =1 1 A ′ B ′ − 2|Ψ − A ′ B ′ Ψ − | used in the privacy witness would give exactly the value | Ŵ priv | = p 1 − p 2 . Note also that ifÛ were not hermitian, we could decomposeÛ =Û R + iÛ I and measure two observableŝ W R key = (|11 AB 00| + |00 AB 11|) ⊗Û R andŴ I key = (|11 AB 00| + |00 AB 11|) ⊗Û I .
IV. TWO-OBSERVABLE PRIVACY ESTIMATION
In this section we will show how to characterize the privacy properties of a noisy entangled state from expectation values of two observables. The first one, given bŷ σ z A ⊗σ z B ⊗1 1 A ′ B ′ , characterizes correlations between measurements performed on the subsystems A and B in the key basis. The security of the key will be inferred using the expectation value of an observableσ
In the further discussion it will be convenient to use the following parameterization ofσ AB :
(23) The nonnegative parameters p + = p 1 + p 2 and p − = 1 − p + = p 3 + p 4 can be interpreted as occupation probabilities of the correlated and the anticorrelated subspaces, spanned respectively by pairs or vectors |00 AB , |11 AB and |01 AB , |10 AB . The other two parameters, given explicitly by ξ + = p 1 /p + and ξ − = p 3 /p − , characterize the off-diagonal elements ofσ AB respectively in the correlated and the anticorrelated sectors and therefore contain information about the privacy properties. Because the off-diagonal elements ofσ AB are nonnegative due to the definition given in Eq. (11) and must ensure positive definiteness ofσ AB , the parameters ξ − , ξ + satisfy the inequality:
i.e. the relevant region for pairs (ξ − , ξ + ) has the shape of a square. In the new parameterization, the lower bound on the key takes the following form:
Because the binary entropies h(ξ + ) and h(ξ − ) are nonnegative, a necessary condition for this bound to be nontrivial is h(p + ) < 1 2 , otherwise the right hand side is not positive. This means that p + must satisfy either 0 ≤ p + < 1 − p * or p * < p + ≤ 1, where p * ≈ 0.89 is the bigger of two solutions of a transcedental equation h(p * ) = 1 2 on the interval 0 ≤ p * ≤ 1. We will restrict our further discussion only to the case p * < p + ≤ 1, as the analysis of the second case 0 ≤ p + < 1 − p * is completely analogous.
Let us now discuss how the parameters ofσ AB are related to measured observables. The parameters p ± can be evaluated directly from the measured observables as
Following discussion after Eq. (25), we will be interested in the regime when p + > p * . Considering the other regime when p + < 1 − p * effectively boils down to swapping the roles of the correlated and the anticorrelated subspaces. These two possibilities can be analyzed jointly by defining
and using in further discussion
The condition p + > p * can be equivalently written as
which defines the minimum value of w z above which the bound on the key can become nontrivial. The second quantity we will use in our analysis will be
It allows us to bound the parameters ξ − and ξ + according to the following inequality which will be at the heart of our reasoning: 
For fixed p ± , this inequality determines the allowed region of (ξ − , ξ + ) in the square defined by Eq. (24) as
When evaluating the lower bound on the key rate K D according to Eq. (25) we are interested in the worst case scenario that is consistent with the measurement results. Therefore our task is to minimize the right hand side of Eq. (25) under constraints given by Eqs. (24) and (31). This is equivalent to maximizing under the same constraints a concave function
The lower bound on the key can be written as
where f max is the maximum of f (ξ − , ξ + ) over the allowed region of parameters. It is useful to note that because f (ξ − , ξ + ) is a convex linear combination of binary entropies h(ξ − ) and h(ξ + ), within the square given by Eq. (24) decreasing either of the arguments ξ − or ξ + will always increase the value of f (ξ − , ξ + ). This in turn implies that f max is reached on the line
To proceed with the maximization, let us start from an observation that if ξ + = 1 2 , i.e. the correlated sector of the density matrix has zero off-diagonal elements, no positive key rate can be guaranteed by Eq. (25). This follows from a straightforward fact that the expression 1−2h(p + )−p + is nonpositive for p * < p + ≤ 1. Therefore no point with ξ + = 1 2 should satisfy Eq. (31). Because the slope of the line (34) is negative, it is sufficient to require that the point (ξ − = 1, ξ + = 1 2 ) is outside the allowed region. This is equivalent to the inequality:
Further analysis depends on whether the point (ξ − = 1 2 , ξ + = 1) is located within the allowed region of parameters. It is easy to verify that this is determined by the relation between p + and w x . If p + > w x , this point satisfies Eq. (31) and the allowed region of parameters has the shape of a trapezoid, as shown in Fig. 2(a) . Consequently, all values 1 2 ≤ ξ − ≤ 1 are allowed. On the other hand, when p + ≤ w x , the allowed region is a triangle, as depicted in Fig. 2(b) . The minimum allowed value of ξ − is then (w x − w z )/(1 − w z ). We can combine these two cases by defining
The maximization of f (ξ − , ξ + ) over the line defined in Eq. (34) can now be written as a supremum over a single parameter:
which inserted into Eq. (33) yields the final form of the bound:
where p + = (1 + w z )/2. The results of a numerical evaluation of the supremum are shown in Fig. 3(a) . It is also possible to derive a slightly weaker bound that requires no numerical maximization, which we will denote asf max . Because the function f (ξ − , ξ + ) is monotonic in each one of its two arguments, as discussed after Eq. (33), we have
where ξ 
The simplified bound therefore takes the following explicit form: The coding of the bound value is the same as in Fig. 3 .
which is shown in Fig. 3(b) . Finally, let us note that the observable w defined in Eq. (15) can be combined with w z to yield a stronger bound on the distillable key. To derive this bound, let us return to Eq. (25) and estimate the last two terms on the right hand side. The inequality shown in Eq. (15) rewritten in the new parametization provides a lower bound on ξ + :
Because the right hand side is greater or equal 1/2, we have h(ξ + ) ≤ h(1/2 + w/2p + ). Further, we obviously have h(ξ − ) ≤ 1. This yields:
Let us note that physical values of w and w z must satisfy the condition (1 + w z )/2 ≥ w, otherwise we would have p 1 +p 2 = p + = (1+w z )/2 < w ≤ p 1 −p 2 and consequently p 2 < 0. In Fig. 4 we depict the bound (43) in the physical region of w and w z .
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have introduced a privacy witness, i.e. an observable, whose mean value allows one to estimate nontrivially from below the amount of secret key, even in the case when the resulting state exhibits the separation of the secret key and the distillable entanglement. In fact this separation may be quite drastic while the witness is working perfectly. To see this let us take
where1 1 A ′ B ′ andV A ′ B ′ stand respectively for bipartite identity and swap operator on the subsystems A ′ B ′ . In the limit of large d the distillable entanglement is bounded by vanishing log-negativity E D ≤ log 2 (1+ (22) does the job. Note in particular that since the key part AB is a two qubit part the above estimate gives the maximum possible value of the secret key K D = log 2 2 = 1 despite the fact that the distillable entanglement of the state is almost zero!
In general the complexity of measuring the privacy witness is related to the Hilbert-Schmidt decomposition of the hermitian operatorÛ used to construct the witness [12] . In the case of the four qubit state that was studied in the experiment reported in Ref. [8] the operator in question is the swap operator which is composed of three terms involving products of Pauli matrices: Taking into account the necessary measurements on the key part this gives in total 2 × 3 = 6 observables to be measured, each formed by a product of four Pauli matrices. This is dramatically less then the full tomography which requires 81 products of four Pauli matrices. Note that in some cases, like the p-bit state discussed above, such an apparently poor measurement has no problem in reporting the key value that lies above the distillable entanglement, which is bounded for our example by the log negativity value E D (̺) ≤ log 2 (1 + 1 2 ) ≈ 0.585. The above approach may be extended to higher dimensions and other twirling techniques may be applied. It may be especially useful when the experimentalist has a good guess about the expected p-bit he state in the laboratory then he or she may estimate the high key contents almost perfectly even if there is virtually no distillable entanglement in the system. Finally let us note that the very difficult problem is to find the nonlinear entanglement witness that would capture collective behavior revealing the key in all the cases when any single-copy entropic fuction based on a one-way protocol fails. It seems that for this one needs quantum secrecy distillation protocols of new generation.
We believe that the present approach will lead to general and systematic development of experimentally friendly methods for detection and estimation of taskdedicated quantum entanglement and other resources.
This approximate expression turns out to reproduce the original bound quite tightly, as evidenced in Fig. 5 depicting the difference between Eq. (A3) and the bound given in Eq. (19) . The difference between the bounds from Eqs. (19) and (A3) as a function of the parameter w.
